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FINAL OFFER ARBITRATION AND 
INTERTEMPORAL COMPROMISE — A COMMENT 
GÈNE SWIMMER 
When I originally discussed the possibility of intertemporal com-
promise under a final offer arbitration System,1 I had hoped that this 
empirical hypothesis would be tested. In a récent issue of this journal, 
Dworkin2 applied the hypothesis to the results of professional baseball 
arbitration. In this reply, I wish to discuss the following issues: the 
appropriateness of baseball as a test group, and Dworkin's interpréta-
tion of his own test results. 
Briefly stated, the hypothesis is that if final offer arbitration 
occurs in one wage round, then the loser in that arbitration will expect 
to win (be selected) in the subséquent round, and will therefore be 
expected to push negotiations to arbitration in the subséquent round. 
The arbitrator wants to look unbiased and thereby avoid aïienating 
either of the parties. A «biased» award might lead to not being rehired 
as an arbitrator. Given this situation, it is clear that the risk of looking 
biased is greater if he sides against the loser in the previous wage 
round. In addition, on purely objective grounds, the fact that one party 
lost in the previous round makes their final position that much more 
reasonable. In any case, the arbitrator cannot make a décision in one 
time period without being affected by the arbitration award in the last 
wage round. In summary, the hypothesis has two testable propositions. 
The probability of going to the arbitration step in time period t would 
be substantially greater if a final offer arbitration award was issued in 
time period t-1, than if the parties negotiated a seulement without 
third-party intervention in period t-1. Secondly, final offer arbitration 
awards between wage round should flip-flop or represent compromises 
with the winner in time period t being the loser in time period t-1 and 
vice versa. 
Does professional baseball arbitration represent a reasonable 
sample in which to test the intertemporal compromise hypothesis? 
Arbitration of baseball salaries more resembles a grievance or rights 
arbitration of an individual than arbitration of outstanding issues in a 
collective agreement for a group of workers. Only one employée is 
affected by the décision of the arbitrator, and the financial stakes 
involved are reasonably meager. Looking at the sample that we are 
provided with by Dworkin, one should note that average différence 
between the management and the employée offer is about $16,000.3 
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Compare this with the Alberta case where 1% represented between 
$100,000 — $150,000 to the parties. One can reasonably argue that the 
risk to the arbitrator of alienating one of the two parties would be 
somewhat lower for the baseball case. A more important réserva-
tion with using baseball arbitration has to do with the fact that in the 
original article, I proposed that an important part of the scénario for 
intertemporal compromise was a situation of inflation which was si-
multaneously reducing workers' real wages and reducing the real size 
of public sector employers' budgets. Clearly none of the baseball 
players involved are particularly concerned with the inflation rate 
(the average salary in major league baseball must exceed $30,000 per 
year), nor are any of the owners faced with possible extrême financial 
difficulty as a resuit of a particular outcome of negotiations with any 
spécifie player. 
Ail thèse caveats aside, I think that a careful look at Dworkin's 
results indicate that they are relatively consistent with the concept 
of intertemporal compromise. The first testable proposition is that the 
probability of arbitration in one year increases when arbitration has 
taken place the year before. Dworkin reports that roughly 500 players 
were eligible for arbitration in 1974 and 1975 and there were 28 arbitra-
tion awards rendered in 1974 and 14 awards in 1975.4 The fact that 
only 4% of negotiations ever reach final offer arbitration each year is 
probably indicative of the low financial stakes involved. It is not con-
trary to the intertemporal compromise hypothesis which has nothing 
to say about the probability of going to arbitration in gênerai — 
only that the probability of arbitration is larger in one period if, in 
fact, arbitration has occured in the period before. According to Dworkin, 
«only» 6 out of the 28 players used arbitration in both 1974 and 1975. 
Thus the proportion («probability») of negotiations going to final offer 
arbitration in 1975, given that arbitration occurred in 1974, is .214. 
Now compare this with the «probability» of arbitration in 1975, given 
no arbitration in 1974. Eight players out of a pool of 472 who did not 
go to arbitration in 1974 (500 — 28) went to arbitration in 1975 for a 
proportion of only .017.5 A test for a différence in two proportions is 
significant at the .01 level. 
Dworkin then discusses the outeomes of the six players who 
in fact did go to final offer arbitration in both 1974 and 1975. He admits 
that in 5 out of 6 cases the awards did flip-flop as the intertemporal 
compromise hypothesis would predict. He goes on to say that the key 
question is whether arbitrator s make décisions on the basis of the most 
reasonable final position or, to minimize the risk of alienating the 
parties.6 
To my mind, Dworkin totally misses the point. It doesn't matter 
what an arbitrator's motives may be. Ex post explanations for reason-
ableness and/or self interest on the part of the arbitrators can be made 
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for arbitration in both baseball and the University of Alberta cases. 
What does matter is whether the parties can expect a flip-flopping of 
awards and if this expectation is built into the negotiating strategy. If 
so, the likelihood that the parties will settle their différences without 
third-party intervention is reduced. None of Dworkin's évidence has 
refuted this proposition. 
INTERTEMPORAL COMPROMISE REVISITED: 
A REPLY 
JAMES B. DWORKIN 
Originally proposed as an «idéal» substitute for interest arbitra-
tion of the conventional variety, final offer arbitration has recently been 
the target of much criticism in académie circles.l Specifically, Profes-
sor Swimmer has postulated that final offer arbitration is subject to the 
«narcotic effect,» and more importantly, that arbitration awards will 
«flip-flop» over time as arbitrators attempt to avoid deciding for any 
party two time periods in a row.2 Rather than evaluating the compar-
ative merits of the final positions of the parties in rendering their 
décisions, Swimmer argues that arbitrators will hand down décisions 
in time period t based solely on what the award was in time period 
t-1. If true, this is clearly a serious indictment of the technique of 
final offer arbitration and of the neutrals who operate as Swimmer has 
suggested. 
The évidence that I presented in this Journal3 from the realm of 
professional baseball demonstrated that a much closer, more rigorous 
examination of the intertemporal compromise notion was necessary 
before accepting it on face validity. Professor Swimmer has taken issue 
with my remarks on the grounds that: (a) professional baseball does 
not serve as an appropriate test group; and, (b) the results from pro-
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